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The English term “early psychosis” was coined in the 1930s to refer to feelings of
irritability, loss of concentration, hypochondriac ideas, moodiness, and lassitude that were
seen to precede the onset of clear-cut hallucinations and delusions. The history of thinking
about “early psychosis” under names such as “latent,” “masked,” “mild,” “simple” or
“sluggish” schizophrenia before World War II and afterwards on the different sides of the
Wall and the Iron Curtain reveals “early psychosis” as a mirror of quite aged international
biologist controversies that are still alive today and to the same extent as they are
misunderstood, are influential in their implications in today’s psychiatry.
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The fifth revision of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual
of Mental Disorders (DSM) for the first time includes a cat-
egory named “attenuated psychosis syndrome” as a condition
for further studies (Yung et al., 2012). What had been pro-
posed at the beginning of the revisions, however, was the intro-
duction of “psychosis risk syndrome” as a new diagnosis to
describe a condition with a recent onset of modest, psychotic-
like symptoms with clinically relevant distress that would indicate
a significantly increased risk of conversion to schizophrenia.
Vigorous debates among international psychiatrists finally came
to the conclusion that it might be premature to recommend
a new category primarily based on future “risk” (Yung et al.,
2010).
The departing point of these debates seemed to be a dissent
about the meaning of “risk for schizophrenia.” It is not only the
way that risk criteria differed within a “near Babylonian speech
confusion” about terms as “prodrome,” “early psychosis,” “at risk
mental state,” “high and ultrahigh risk” (Schultze-Lutter et al.,
2011, 2012), there was—and probably still is—also a confusion
about the significance of “risk for schizophrenia” tout court.
Although the DSM does not claim to pinpoint disease entities,
the proposed formulation of a new diagnosis, “psychosis risk syn-
drome,” did seem to implicate the existence of a disease or illness.
But is a “risk for a disease” already a disease? Yes, it is, was
claimed by proponents advocating the introduction of a new psy-
chosis spectrum disorder in DSM-5 under the words “Probably
at-risk, but certainly ill” (Ruhrmann et al., 2010); no, it isn’t,
was claimed by others. Interestingly, this up-to-date controversy
that is still going on for the eleventh revision of the International
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Classification of Diseases (ICD) appears like a reflection of bygone
biologist controversies in Post-War German, Anglo-Saxon and
Soviet Psychiatry.
The English term “early psychosis” entered the stage of classical
psychiatry in 1938, first of all with reference to “early diagnosis.”
This new interest in diagnosing schizophrenia early was revolu-
tionary in a time that had thought of schizophrenia as a disease
process that per definition would lead into premature dementia:
dementia praecox. The treatments by hypoglycaemia and con-
vulsions that had been introduced since 1934 by Manfred Sakel
and Ladislas Meduna caused to totter the concept of incurability
and “brought into the foreground the necessity for early diagno-
sis,” as the most promising ameliorations were obtained in “early
cases” (Mayer-Gross, 1938). Even conceptually quite a gap, then
psychiatrists needed just a little step from the idea of early detec-
tion of a disease to the idea that the disease itself might have an
early phase or even be a specific early form of a chronic disease:
early schizophrenia or more general, early psychosis (Cameron,
1938a,b).
EARLY SCHIZOPHRENIA OR PRODROMES IN CLASSICAL
EUROPEAN PSYCHIATRY
Subtle changes in mood and personality that gained signifi-
cance retrospectively had of course always been part of the case
descriptions in the classic textbooks on dementia praecox and
schizophrenia. In Emil Kraepelin’s description of dementia prae-
cox in 1893, a potpourri of initial symptoms, especially of somatic
kind, was given:
Usually the psychosis begins with symptoms of general malaise
and uneasiness, headaches, ear noises, dizziness, disagreeable feel-
ings in different parts of the body, insomnia and poor appetite.
The sick persons become shy, withdrawn into themselves, down-
cast, anxious, stopworking, express vague concerns especially with
hypochondriac contents (Kraepelin, 1893, 439).
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Concerning the talk about the “early” or “initial” symptoms,
Eugen Bleuler felt he needed to add some words in order to
prevent misunderstandings concerning the meaning of “early
symptoms”:
When speaking of initial symptoms of schizophrenia we have to
restrain us to the first symptoms that were noticed; too often we
just don’t know the symptoms that really appeared first.
In the corresponding footnote he went on to explain:
We do not speak of “prodromes.” We might differentiate pro-
dromes of a seizure and inter-current signs from the full-blown
seizure, if we like—prodromes of a disease, however, I am not able
to imagine. What are named in this way are the first symptoms
that we are not able to interpret in the right way (Bleuler, 1911,
206).
Speaking of “prodromes” was, however, quite common in
European Psychiatry. Years before Bleuler proposed his con-
cept of “schizophrenia” as a substitute for Kraepelin’s “dementia
praecox,” notions such as “depressive prodromes” or “prodromal
pseudoneurasthenia” had already been discussed in the continen-
tal psychiatric literature (Pascal, 1906, 1907).
No matter what words were used, these quotations clearly
show that the feelings of irritability, loss of concentration,
hypochondriac ideas, headaches, moodiness, and lassitude that
were seen to precede the onset of clear-cut hallucinations and
delusions since the earliest descriptions of dementia praecox or
schizophrenia were not conceptualized as “risk” signs for the
occurrence of a disease, but they were seen as already mani-
festing the disease process: However, “what this schizophrenic
process consists in, we don’t know,” admitted Bleuler in
1911, even if there were clear findings of mild brain atro-
phy and specific histological changes in severe cases. Bleuler
continued:
The question if there might be a specific brain disposition to
schizophrenia and how it would manifest has still not been
addressed at all (Bleuler, 1911, 376f).
BLEULER’S LATENT SCHIZOPHRENIA
Bleuler’s favorite explication of the pathomechanism of
schizophrenia was the idea of an infection or autoimmune
process, which may manifest in a chronic or acute manner
and may even stay latent over a longer period (Bleuler, 1911,
376f). Not surprisingly, latent schizophrenia was considered
a very widespread and underdiagnosed phase of schizophre-
nia with fuzzy boundaries especially to schizophrenia simplex
at first extensively described with patient examples by Otto
Diem in 1903 (Diem, 1903). By separating this form of
schizophrenia from hebephrenia, as opposed to Kraepelin,
Bleuler gave schizophrenia simplex and latent schizophrenia the
central exemplary position in his theory of “schizophrenia,”
demonstrating his advocated dichotomy between fundamental
symptoms (e.g., cognitive or emotional blunting) and accessory
symptoms (e.g., hallucinations or delusions) (Bleuler, 1911,
194). Consequently, seemingly uncharacteristic symptoms
such as increased distraction, forgetfulness, reduced emotional
reactivity or anhedony and avolition characterized Bleulerian
core schizophrenia and were therefore no risk and no pro-
drome: “A latent schizophrenia already is a psychosis” (Bleuler,
1917, 29).
The problem of drawing the line between character and disease
was answered with resolute words:
As it is clear that many cases of schizophrenia go back into youth
and as many cases impress as simply intensification of the existing
character, it seems probable tome that these autistic abnormalities
in character are the first symptoms themselves and not only an
expression of the disposition (Bleuler, 1911, 206).
Nine years later, however, in the 3rd edition of his textbook,
Bleuler used Kretschmer’s term “schizoid” for the first time in
order to admit the unresolved question of the qualitative bound-
aries or only quantitative differences between constitution or
predisposition and disease:
As from which level of anomaly on a person should be classi-
fied solely as a “schizoid” psychopath or else as schizophrenic and
mentally ill, is still not possible to define at all (Bleuler, 1920, 325).
To what extent these personality peculiarities already “are the
young disease or solely expression of the predisposition,” was
questioned by Bleuler especially from the point of view of genet-
ics: of course, one must differentiate between hereditary and phe-
nomenological visible features of schizophrenia, “Erbschizose”
and “Sichtschizose,” because the hereditary features are linked
to the visible ones “by a long causal chain complicated prob-
ably by the influence of some inner and external factors”
(Bleuler, 1917, 31). Also “accompanying psychic predispositions,
that per se have nothing to do with the gene of the disease,
might contribute”; Bleuler here thinks of “a certain sensitivity
that does not only appertain to future schizophrenics” (Bleuler,
1917, 32).
After the collapse of Nazism into “euthanasia” and World War
II, West-German Psychiatry turned its back on the genetic theory
of schizophrenia, much more than Bleuler—in spite of his criti-
cism on the methodology of Ernst Rüdin’s studies—would have
advocated.
THE END OF CLASSICAL BIOLOGICAL PSYCHIATRY
Already Kurt Schneider recommended his pragmatic symp-
tomatologic classification oriented on his first (e.g., audi-
tory hallucinations and delusions of control) and second
rank symptoms, because he had capitulated in face of the
indecisive results of the biologic research in schizophrenia.
Bleuler’s schizophrenia concept was simply but silently put
aside.
With the retirement of Schneider from the chief position of
the psychiatric university clinic in Heidelberg in 1955, “classi-
cal psychiatry” was said by Walter von Baeyer, his successor,
“to have come to its end; the future was for existential anal-
ysis (“Daseinsanalyse”) in the sense of Heidegger, Husserl and
Binswanger” (Huber, 2009, 70). In other places of European
Psychiatry, the influence of psychoanalysis had already departed
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large parts of thinking about “early psychosis” from Bleuler’s
classical biological views.
Even if early schizophrenia was still in the spotlight, there
was a “sort of panic” in West-German Psychiatry a year before
the Wall was build: there was an anxious suspicion that every-
thing concerning schizophrenia research had been seen and
done in a wrong way (Kraemer, 1960). Almost everything of
the biologic view on schizophrenia and the diagnostic meth-
ods used, was questioned as being wrong. Accordingly, in the
60s, West-German Psychiatry started to see paranoid schizophre-
nia and early schizophrenia in an anthropologic light and to
explain them by the individual situation in the life of the con-
cerned person: a personal “failure on the road of life” (Zutt
and Kuhlenkampff, 1958). Similarly, as in the classic psychiatric
schools situated in the west of the new Iron Curtain in Europe,
the “schizophrenic person” gained center stage (Wyrsch, 1949).
“Schizophrenic” characteristics were explained in the light of
Heidegger’s existential philosophy: “eccentricity, crankiness, man-
nerism as three forms of failed existence” (Binswanger, 1956, “Drei
Formen missglückten Daseins. Verstiegenheit, Verschrobenheit,
Manieriertheit”). Symptoms of beginning schizophrenia were
reformulated in Heidegger’s language as “disclosure, dissolution
and overwhelming as forms of loss of the existential position
in life” (Kulenkampff, 1955, “Entbergung, Entgrenzung und
Überwältigung—als Weisen des Standverlustes”). At the institu-
tional level, the separation of the departments for neurology and
psychiatry in the university clinics was pressed ahead and the
(West-)German Council of Science and Humanities insisted in
1960 on the implementation of professorships for psychotherapy.
Klaus Conrad, who had published a phenomenological analy-
sis of the steps of symptom progression at the onset of schizophre-
nia entitled “The Beginning Schizophrenia” (Conrad, 1958) in
1958, criticized the diagnostic practice of the time: what tradi-
tionally had been classified as “beginning schizophrenic phase”
and already had been challenged by Kretschmer’s “schizoid”-
concept into “a sensitive delusion of reference on the base
of a schizoid constitution,” that would nowadays be seen, “in
Frankfurt as a consequence of a deranged existential order of
being, as a form of existential failure in the pursuit of life”
(Conrad, 1959, 489). As a matter of fact and in contrast to Karl
Leonhard who migrated to the GDR and took up the chair of the
Charité-Nervenklinik in East-Berlin in 1957, Jürg Zutt andCaspar
Kulenkampff abandoned the classic biological Frankfurt-Kleist-
Wernicke school. But also the Heidelberg school was increas-
ingly marked by the wish to explain the psychopathology out
of individual and family psychodynamics, as is evident in the
academic writing of senior physicians of the Heidelberg clinic,
for example Heinz Häfner’s “Existential Analytical Investigations
in the Structure and Course of Psychopaths” (Häfner, 1961), or
Karl-Peter Kisker’s study results “Comparative Situation Analysis
of Beginning Schizophrenias and Reactive Maldevelopment in
Adolescents” (Kisker and Strötzel, 1961/62).
Not by chance, “adolescent crisis” or “maturation crisis” became
the main differential diagnoses of beginning schizophrenia
(Kulenkampff, 1964; Feldmann, 1967). These concepts together
with the idea of “existential failure” reflect a way of thinking about
“early psychosis” that American psychiatry had already chosen
before World War II.
MENTAL HYGIENE AND THE “SCHIZOPHRENIC REACTION”
IN THE DSM
Contrary to the situation in Europe, American Psychiatry gener-
ally developed independently from neurology and was decisively
shaped by its founder Adolph Meyer and his psychobiological
school. In opposition to the classical pre-war European view
that granted psychological factors not much more than the role
of unveiling the latent biological basic disorder, Meyer’s school
explained all mental diseases as “psychological reaction types”
(Muncie, 1935). The early American favor for early detection
and prevention grew exactly out of this psychological perspective:
under the assumption that all mental diseases can be explained
by psychological, environmental causes, it was just a logical rea-
soning that they might be impeded or nipped in the bud if
their causes would be detected early enough and neutralized.
Meyer’s Mental Hygiene Movement was based on this argument
(Kalinowsky, 1955).
The emigration of European psychoanalysts to America dur-
ing National Socialism led to the integration of Freud’s theory
of intrapsychic conflict into the environmentally oriented Mental
Hygiene Movement: a broadly defined psychosocial model was
born that conceptualized even schizophrenia as reducible to one
basic psychosocial process: Karl Menninger’s “failure of the suffer-
ing individual to adapt to his or her environment” (Wilson, 1993,
400). Only the intensity of the trauma determined if the reaction
would be of a neurotic or of a psychotic kind. Symptoms were
seen in the psychodynamic light of “meaning.” As a result, the
frontiers between character eccentricities and schizophrenia van-
ished on psychological grounds. Schizophrenia was just a more
severe psychological maladjustment than other personality or
neurotic abnormalities; it was no longer a genetic disease but
rather a psychosocial reaction, as expressed in the revision of the
Army nomenclature under the leadership of Menninger, the first
DSM published in 1951, and its revealing term: “schizophrenic
reaction.”
The psychodynamic or even psychoanalytic interpretation of
early schizophrenia was already evident in Harry Stack Sullivan’s
lecture entitled “The onset of schizophrenia,” held on the occa-
sion of the joint meeting of the American Psychiatric Association
(APA) and the American Psychopathological Association in 1926
(Sullivan, 1927), as it is in the famous article on the “Diagnostic
evaluation of early schizophrenia” written by Phillip Polatin and
Paul Hoch in 1947 (Polatin and Hoch, 1947). The introduction
of the term “ambulatory schizophrenia” by Gregory Zilboorg in
1941, “pseudoneurotic schizophrenia” by Hoch and Polatin in 1949
and the interpretation of “Borderline States’ by Robert Knight in
1953, continued to foster this psychodynamic view on early and
mild psychosis (Zilboorg, 1941; Hoch and Polatin, 1949; Knight,
1953).
Granted, three of the first articles published in English on
early schizophrenia still had a classical medical model of the con-
dition, but the articles were written by a German psychiatrist
who had immigrated to London (Mayer-Gross, 1938) and by a
Scottish psychiatrist who trained under the successor of Bleuler
at the famous Burghoelzi Clinic in Switzerland during publica-
tion year (Cameron, 1938a,b). Even if classical views were still
published in Anglo-Saxon psychiatry, their impact on thinking
about “early psychosis” was almost non-existent in the years that
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followed World War II—just as the results of the clinical study
“The Genetics of Schizophrenia” of another German refugee from
National Socialism (Kallmann, 1938).
During the 1960s, the view of mental disorders as non-
biological psychosocial problems became the source of
anti-psychiatric arguments: “if conceived of psychosocially,
psychiatric illness is not the province of medicine because
psychiatric problems are not truly medical, but social, political,
and legal” (Wilson, 1993, 402); mental illness was a myth
and psychiatric labels arbitrary designations (Szaz, 1961). The
revision of the DSM, published in 1968 by the APA as DSM-II,
consequently dropped the term “reaction” even if psychody-
namic views largely prevailed besides a re-appropriation of
classical concepts (American Psychiatric Association, 1968).
Orienting itself on the 8th revision of the ICD that listed—in
classical Bleulerian tradition—as subtypes of schizophrenia
“Schizophrenia simplex” and “latent schizophrenia” (World
Health Organisation, 1965), the APA also consented on a “simple
type” and a “latent type” of schizophrenia. In explaining “latent
schizophrenia,” however, it was added that—among “incipient”
and “pre-psychotic”—“pseudo-neurotic, pseudo-psychopathic,
or borderline-schizophrenia are categorized here”—which
clearly were of psychodynamic origin (American Psychiatric
Association, 1968).
SLUGGISH SCHIZOPHRENIA IN SOVIET PSYCHIATRY
Soviet Psychiatry strictly rejected western anthropological inter-
pretations of mental illness denunciating these views “as a sign
of a severe crisis in capitalistic countries’ psychiatry” (Sternberg,
1964).
Characteristic for Soviet psychiatry was not only its clear bio-
logical orientation, but also especially its preoccupation with
Bleuler’s “latent schizophrenia.” Clinical research started as early
as 1924 at the Moscow Institute for Neuropsychiatric Prophylaxis
and centered on the questions of “mild,” “attenuated” or “masked”
schizophrenia. However, Bleuler was criticized for using the word
“latent” in a context where schizophrenia was already man-
ifest, but in a mild, non-psychotic form, just as he himself
had very well tried to explain, but was easily misread by the
unclear signification of the word “latent.” As a consequence,
mild or sluggish schizophrenia was assumed to consist of a
sort of attenuated organic, perhaps toxic, process with slow pro-
gression (Kameneva, 1935). The director of the Institute for
Neuropsychiatric Prophylaxis of the time, L. M. Rosenstein, him-
self pointed out that the elaboration of the concept “sluggish
schizophrenia” was conditioned by the politically enforced re-
structuring of the medical psychiatric facilities with closure of
private consultations and a concentration on polyclinic centers.
“The moments that mostly determine the development of scien-
tific categories of our discipline are the current historically-given
forms of our psychiatric practice,” wrote Rosenstein in his report
about the new achievements concerning “early psychosis” since
the foundation of the Soviet Union (SU) in 1922. Themost recent
form of psychiatric practice, “namely the set-up of psychiatric wel-
fare units called ‘dispensaries’ ” where “psychiatrists are facing a
material, that usually counts as ‘healthy’ or ‘nervous’ and will have
to do prophylactic work on it,” is feeding back on the theoretical
concepts (Rosenstein, 1933, 299f). The parallel of the dispensaries
to the institutional development inside the American Mental
Hygiene Movement is quite interesting due to the different if not
opposing theoretical foundations. In Europe, attention had been
paid to the mild forms of schizophrenia until the end of World
War II after the classic description of “Heboidophrenia” by Karl
Ludwig Kahlbaum and “Dementia simplex” by Diem, especially
in the context of the growing acceptance of another psychiatric
practice: psychotherapy (Kronfeld, 1928; Wyrsch, 1945).
The focus of clinical interest on bland, mild or slug-
gish schizophrenias was to shape the whole Soviet theory of
schizophrenia that was seen as a life-long process of a genetically
determined disease (Sternberg, 1973). Classification remained
oriented on the course or progressive evolution of symptoms
seen in the “unitary psychosis layer model” formulated by Andrej
Sneshnewski (Piatnitski et al., 1998).
GERD HUBER AND GISELA GROSS AS ADVOCATES OF THE
CLASSICAL VIEWS IN WEST GERMANY
Few West-German psychiatrists have been invited for lectures in
the German Democratic Republic (GDR). Thanks to an invita-
tion of the (East-)Berlin Society for Psychiatry and Neurology
at the Humboldt-University, Gerd Huber was among them to
present his pneumencephalographic studies in schizophrenia in
the year 1958 (Dietrich, 1958). The university psychiatric clinic
of Heidelberg with its growing focus on anthropological think-
ing had just generously allowed Huber to finish his compilation
of pneumencephalographies taken at the onset of schizophrenia
that he had started in 1950 in order to correlate psychopatholog-
ical symptoms with localized brain atrophy (Huber, 1957a). The
description of “coenaesthetic schizophrenia” that Huber published
in the same year (Huber, 1957b), was sparely appreciated inWest-
German Psychiatry, but was received with emphatic approval in
the SU and GDR. It is no surprise then that the clinical “differ-
entiation of hypochondriac syndromes,” was seen “as currently
one of the most difficult and urging psychiatric problems” in
Soviet psychiatry. Consequently, Huber’s work was applauded as
an important contribution to the organic base of “hypochondriac
schizophrenia” as already described by the Russian psychiatrist G.
A. Rothstein (Sternberg, 1964).
As the leading physician of the psychiatric outpatient depart-
ment of the Heidelberg university psychiatry, Huber had been
able to conduct his barely connived follow-up examinations until
1962 for the construction of his “Heidelberg Checklist of Basic
Symptoms” (Huber, 1962) that is nowadays well known under
the name “Bonn Scale for the Assessment of Basic Symptoms”
(BSAB) and is used as “an instrument for the assessment of
schizophrenia proneness” (Gross et al., 1987; Klosterkötter et al.,
1997).
“Barely connived” was Huber’s psychopathologic assessment
of subjective complaints of patients with early schizophrenia
because of the biological idea on which they were founded. The
reason why Huber was interested in subjective experience and
feelings was solely because he thought that they would shed light
on the organic base of schizophrenia. The subjective symptoms
in early psychosis were credited to lead directly to the biologic
“fundamental”—“primary”—or “basic”—symptoms.
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The subjective experience of subtle cognitive deficits and
changed self-feeling were originally identified by Huber as “pure
defect” in chronic schizophrenia after the psychotic symptoms
had disappeared, but then recognized in the prodromal phase.
The notion of “basic symptoms” was used to make clear that
these subtle feelings are the core symptoms, the “most primary
symptoms” of schizophrenia in the sense of their direct organic
origin (Huber, 1966). Even though some of the contents of para-
noid ideation in full-blown schizophrenia might be explicable by
the individual personal situation of the affected person, what is
seen in early psychosis is the direct expression of the organic
origin of schizophrenia according to Huber and not analyzable
in the frame of existential psychiatry. Likewise, Klaus Conrad
thought it was possible to extract an analysis of the different
stages of “beginning schizophrenia” out of the examination of
uniformed soldiers realized during World War II: the question
was not about individual conflicts and situations but about the
neuropsychological laws of symptom progression at the onset of
schizophrenia (Conrad, 1958). Evidence for the neurobiological
determination of the different stages of the changing experi-
ence in early schizophrenia would also have been searched for
by Conrad with biological means, just as he already had tried to
find the genetics of epilepsy or schizoid constitution, if he had
not died in the year of the construction of the wall before assum-
ing the directory of the Max Planck Institute for Psychiatry in
Munich.
Huber, his lifelong co-worker Gisela Gross and sympathiz-
ing psychologists nevertheless arrived at pinpointing “basic”
symptoms even in “the failure state of latent schizophrenia”
(Blankenburg, 1968), a denomination that might associate an
anthropological psychodynamic account inMenninger’s tradition
as “failure to adapt to personal life challenges.” On the contrary,
the “juvenile-asthenic failure-syndromes,” as Huber called “the fail-
ure states of early psychosis,” were traced back to an organic base
(Glatzel and Huber, 1968). This way, a seemingly uncharacter-
istic symptomatology was conceptualized as “abortive, latent or
masked schizophrenia” (Gross et al., 1982). The number of col-
leagues who sympathized with this view in West Germany might
be counted on one hand relying on the BRD-psychiatrists who
followed Huber’s invitation to the Weißenauer Symposien. The
first symposium, which still took place at the psychiatric hos-
pital “Weißenau” in 1971 (at this time under the directory of
Huber before he finally found refuge in Bonn and theWeißenauer
Symposion with him), was not accidentally dedicated to the eti-
ology of schizophrenia, and defined a clear biologic direction of
future research (Huber, 1971). The extent to which this alignment
was rejected as outdated and obsolete in the 70s inWest-Germany
is mirrored in the blatant opposition of the audience that Huber
encountered during his lecture on schizophrenia on the occasion
of his application for the directory of the Heidelberg psychiatric
university clinic in 1972: the audience wove a banner with the
words: “Huber, evil excrescence of bourgeois psychiatry” (Huber,
1996, 237).
THE ROLE OF PSYCHOLOGY
Perhaps surprisingly, it was the practice of psychotherapy of
schizophrenia that finally led to a revival of the medical model
of “early psychosis” thanks to a newly flourishing branch of
psychology called “experimental psychology.”
Clinical psychologists with an originally psychoanalytic train-
ing began to recognize that cognitive deficits of patients with
schizophrenia impeded psychotherapy on large grounds. This
psychotherapeutic approach finally paved the way to a clinical
research in psychology that tried to understand the mechanisms
of the observed cognitive deficits in schizophrenia by applying the
techniques of experimental psychology (Chapman et al., 1959).
One of the very first programs of this kindwas situated in Glasgow
and headed by Arthur McGie, the Principal Psychologist at Royal
DundeeLiff Hospital and honorary professor at the Department
of Psychiatry at St Andrews University. As early as 1961, McGhie
and a young psychiatrist, named James Chapman, published their
observations on specific “disorders of attention and perception in
early schizophrenia” (McGhie and Chapman, 1961). Chapman
gained his MD with a thesis entitled “On the early diagnosis of
schizophrenia” in 1964 and his summary publication of his results
in 1966 as “The early symptoms of schizophrenia” became the start-
ing point for other psychologists all over the world to reconsider
early psychosis on empirical and finally biological grounds as
shown by the example of the German psychologist Lilo Süllwold
and her Frankfurt Complaint Questionnaire that is the instrument
most widely used in Europe for assessing subjective experience in
schizophrenia (Chapman, 1964, 1966; Süllwold, 1977).
Initially employed for a research program about the family
psychodynamics of pre-schizophrenic adolescents at the psy-
chiatric university clinic in Heidelberg, she started to col-
lect complaints of subjective cognitive deficits in these young
patients. Already in her first presentations on the occasion of
the Weißenauer Symposien in 1971 and 1973, Süllwold explicitly
combined her phenomenological approach—for which she cites
McGhie and Chapman—with a biological interpretation of the
observed malfunctioning (Süllwold, 1971, 1973). The gradually
developing Frankfurt Complaint Questionnaire aimed to enable a
reliable early differential diagnosis of pre-psychotic schizophre-
nia in contrast to neurotic troubles (Süllwold, 1973), even if
Süllwold, just as McGhie und Chapman, was not just interested in
early diagnosis, but finally also in a reapplication of the findings
for cognitive behavioral psychotherapy (Chapman and McGhie,
1963).
Interestingly, the Anglo-Saxon results of primary attention
and perceptual deficits in schizophrenia matched with the Soviet
experimental schizophrenia research of Poljakow (Poljakow,
1971) for example. In the first publication of her Frankfurt
Complaint Questionnaire, Süllwold referred to Poljakow the same
way she had already pointed out in her presentation of the very
beginnings of her complaint list, that the experimental research
on schizophrenia conducted by Anglo-Saxon clinical psychology,
eventually accomplishes Kraeplin’s demand and so tied in with
the tradition of classic psychiatry (Süllwold, 1971, 37; Süllwold,
1977).
Actually, there was a remarkable intertwining on the subject of
experimental psychological research on the perceptual and cog-
nitive deficits in schizophrenia across the Iron Curtain. Frank
Fish for example, a Scottish psychiatrist, summarized the newly
developed neuropsychological test methods for his colleagues in
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West-Germany (Fish, 1966) and was invited, on the other side
of the Wall, by the East-German psychiatric journal, to present
his own neuropsychological testing results in schizophrenia (Fish,
1965). Equally, papers about experimental psychology in their
significance for the biological theory of schizophrenia and their
basic symptoms were welcome in the East even if written by
west-psychologists (Plaum, 1978). The transfer was clearly not
achieved by psychology as such, but by psychology as a servant
of biological psychiatry.
Especially the question of subjective symptoms of beginning
schizophrenia, that Conrad had initially called to mind afterWorld
War II, as well as their neuropsychological, neurobiological expla-
nation by Huber and Gross (Gross, 1969) and Süllwold (Süllwold,
1977) in West-Germany, McGhie and Chapman from the UK
(Chapman, 1966), Dudek from Canada (Dudek, 1969), and
Freedman and Chapman, USA (Freedman and Chapman, 1973),
started to form a bridge over the Iron Curtain. Opposing the
American psychiatric tradition of Menninger with its psychody-
namic view on schizophrenia, Fish outlined his neurophysiologic
theory via Conrad’s phase-model of beginning schizophrenia
(Fish, 1961).
The mission of psychology in this context (McGhie, Süllwold,
Chapman and Freedman all of them were psychologists) was
couched in the clearest possible terms by the American psy-
chologist Paul Meehl in his lecture addressed to the American
Psychological Association in 1962: “in the near future” psychol-
ogy with its new experimental techniques will help “to establish
that schizophrenia, while its content is learned, is fundamentally
a neurological disease of genetic origin” (Meehl, 1962).
Meehl’s taking side with genetics and his concept of “schizo-
taxia” as genetic foundation of the “schizotype” character, the last
being only the compensated form of schizophrenia, as in clini-
cally compensated cardiac or kidney disease, did not appeal much
to the large parts of psychiatry and psychology that still held
on to psychodynamics up to the end of the 70s (Meehl, 1989).
The American psychiatrist Joseph Zubin together with the psy-
chologist Bonnie Spring were to have greater success in bringing
together the warring parties by integrating all available psycho-
logical, biological and social aspects into a recycled concept of
“vulnerability” (Zubin and Spring, 1977). By no longer defining
“vulnerability” as “causa interna” but as “the empirical probability
that an individual will experience an episode” of schizophrenia,
Zubin and Spring admitted any possibilities of how this inclina-
tion comes about: it may be of genetic origin, it may be caused
by acquired etiological factors such as perinatal complications,
substance abuse but also “just” by family stress. However, “vul-
nerability” is generally seen as meaning more than “probability”
or “risk” because a causal claim is implicitly made concerning the
enumerated factors.
LATENT SCHIZOPHRENIA AND PRODROMAL SYMPTOMS
AFTER 1980
The overabundant labeling of schizophrenia due to psychody-
namic presuppositions in American Psychiatry and due to its
concept of “soft” or “sluggish schizophrenia” in Soviet Psychiatry
had meanwhile come to light in 1973 with the publication of the
first results of the International Pilot Study of Schizophrenia that
was conducted by the World Health Organization since end of
the 60s (World Health Organisation, 1973). With the desire to
enhance diagnostic reliability and thus re-open possibilities for
meaningful research, the APA decided on a 3rd revision of the
DSM that was to be a non-theoretical purely descriptive manual
with emphasis on the assessment of easily observable symptoms
for objective measurement (American Psychiatric Association,
1980). Consequently, “simple” and “latent” schizophrenia dis-
appeared; diagnosis of schizophrenia completely oriented itself
toward Schneiderian first as well as second rank symptoms.
On the other hand, non-psychotic, schizophrenia-like disor-
ders were classified as “schizoid” or “schizotype personality
disorders.”
However, the symptoms of simple and latent schizophrenia
also found refuge under another label: the list of prodromal
symptoms that enumerated eight mostly behavioral, observable,
so-called “negative symptoms”: “1, social isolation; 2, marked
impairment in role functioning; 3, markedly peculiar behavior;
4, marked impairment in personal hygiene and grooming; 5,
blunted, flat, or inappropriate affect; 6, digressive, vague, overe-
laborate, circumstantial, or metaphorical speech; 7, odd or bizarre
ideation, or magical thinking and 8, unusual perceptual expe-
riences.” That list was added with “9, loss of energy” in the
DSM-III-R in 1987.
In the SU, the classic concept of “early psychosis” in the sense
of “mild” or “latent” schizophrenia lived on without any chal-
lenge due to the application of a self made classification system
for mental disorders completely independent of DSM and ICD.
Due to this system, developed at the Moscow Psychiatric Institute
by Sneshnewski, a wide concept of “schizophrenia” remained in
place that also encompassed the non-psychotic forms. The study
of these “mild” forms of schizophrenia had remained a core theme
of Soviet psychiatric research until end of the 80s. Many sub-
types of mild schizophrenia have been differentiated, among them
“simplex-schizophrenia,” “hypochondriac schizophrenia,” “hysteri-
form schizophrenia,” forms with predominant depersonalization or
affective symptoms, “anancastic schizophrenia” or “psychopathic
like schizophrenia in childhood” (Sneshnewski, 1977; Piatnitski
et al., 1998).
These biological concepts of schizophrenia united psychiatrists
across the Iron Curtain in such a way that enabled international
symposia in the SU, as the “Biological and Genetical Aspects of
Schizophrenia” symposium in 1973 that was jointly organized by
the World Psychiatric Association and the Moscow Academy for
Medical Sciences.
Nevertheless, in the course of the political misuse of psychiatry
in the SU, the Soviet concept of “sluggish schizophrenia” was criti-
cized concerning its possiblemisuse for political reasons (Merskey
and Shafran, 1986).
Shortly after the fall of the Wall and before the end of the
SU, two symposia took place in 1990 mirroring the lasting con-
troversial position of the “early psychosis” concept: the presen-
tation of the first prospective study on early schizophrenia on
the occasion of the 8th Weißenauer Symposion in March 1990
and the Symposium “Symptoms of schizophrenia that are not cri-
teria of DSM” at Annual Meeting of the APA in New York,
May 1990.
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The first prospective study on early diagnosis of schizophre-
nia has been initiated by Huber and Gross in 1970, was founded
by the West-German Ministry for Research and Technology and
was later on continued by Joachim Klosterkötter under the name
of “CologneEarlyRecognition-Study” (CER) (Gross et al., 1992;
Klosterkötter et al., 2001). At the 8th Weißenauer Symposion,
the discussion that followed the two lectures presenting the
very first results of the “Basic-symptom oriented diagnostic of
schizophrenic vulnerability” (Gross et al., 1990; Klosterkötter et al.,
1990) became a crossfire: due to the fact that the basic symp-
toms that served the description of the “prodrome” now sailed
under the flag of Zubin’s “vulnerability,” the question arose if
vulnerability really always already is a pathology and sign of a dis-
ease. If “vulnerability” equaled “prodrome,” wouldn’t this mean
that the prodrome—and with it the initial phase of schizophre-
nia, would be present from birth on, if one credited genetics
or perinatal trauma with a role in vulnerability? Accordingly,
would the term “vulnerability” equal “compensated” or “latent
schizophrenia”? Would “vulnerability for schizophrenia” already
be schizophrenia? The oscillation of the conceptualization of the
basic symptoms between state or trait markers was of course
not entirely innocent for this ambiguity. Moreover, anticipat-
ing the objection that the basic symptoms that were used for
the diagnosis of schizophrenic vulnerability had not proved
to be specific for schizophrenia, Gisela Gross frankly declared
that there would not exist any specific psychopathological phe-
nomena at all in psychiatry—and thus made a comment in
the direction of an unspecific vulnerability in the sense of a
strong “unitary psychosis” model of mental disorder comparable
to the Russian “layer-model,” yet continued by arguing that
the basic symptoms would not exist in personality or neurotic
disorders. Thus she corrected herself to a sort of weak “uni-
tary psychosis” model of affective and schizophrenia disorders.
However, as a matter of fact, the work of the Bonn School
on early diagnosis has been understood as if there would be
a schizophrenia specific cognitive vulnerability that could be
identified by the subtle psychopathological examination via the
“Bonn Scale” and would enable early detection and early treat-
ment (Klosterkötter et al., 2001). In any case, current formu-
lations as “Diagnosing schizophrenia in the initial prodromal
phase” make just too clear that “prodrome” is seen in a classi-
cal Bleulerian perspective as the initial state of schizophrenia and
not as “risk/vulnerability” for schizophrenia (Klosterkötter et al.,
2001).
At the APA symposium in 1990, Huber and Gross argued
for their classic view on early psychosis, basic symptoms and
prodromes. Nevertheless, the list of prodromal symptoms was
dropped for the DSM-IV in 1994: without any alternative.
Even if the ICD-10 still knows of schizophrenia simplex (World
Health Organisation, 1992), no criteria are given neither in the
DSM-IV nor the ICD-10 to diagnose “prodromes” of schizophre-
nia or “latent schizophrenia”. Under the strong promotion of
the professional descendants of Huber and Gross, however, the
DSM-5 has now introduced “attenuated psychotic syndrome” as a
research category, which may well be seen—just as the originally
proposed “psychosis risk syndrome”—as standing in the tradition
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